stop leaking yield.

the mev-to-revenue engine for uniswap v4. turning the most valuable seconds in defi into a permanent revenue engine.

tvl $
pools
volume $
how it works

three moments.
one rebate.

every block, the right to make the first swap on a lode pool is auctioned. the winning bid is paid in eth, streamed back to lps, and a slice funds buybacks.

01 / auction

the top-of-block bid

searchers submit sealed bids for the first swap of the block. one winner, one price, paid in eth before any user swap settles.

block 21,448,902 tx pending
sellbalance 12.40
1.20 eth
receive≈ rate 3,118.40
3,742.08 usdc
routev4 · lode hook
price impact0.04%
winning bid (toxic flow)0.0184 eth
premium → lps+0.0156 eth
02 / rebate

the lp vault

winning bids stream into the pool's rebate vault. lps earn standard fees, plus their share of every auction, block by block.

vault · eth/usdc 0.05%30d
$1,284,617
+ $9,418 today · +0.74%
per-block rebate0.0142 eth
03 / split

the splitter

a fixed split routes proceeds: lps first, then buybacks, then treasury. on-chain. unchanged across pools.

block 21,448,902 · settled
winner0xa84f…cb12
0.0184 eth
lps80%
buyback15%
treasury5%
→ vault0.01472 eth
→ lode market buy0.00276 eth
→ treasury0.00092 eth
the token

lode · 100m supply

38%
future emissions
4-year linear, decaying, governance-throttleable downward.
44%
protocol-owned liquidity
seeded into lode/eth + lode/usdc pools at tge. no airdrop, no claim — fair launch.
8%
core team
12-month cliff, 36-month linear vest (4yr total).
10%
treasury
governance-gated; >0.5%/qtr requires 5-day vote.
the path

roadmap

2026 q2
stealth mainnet deploy
5 pools in shadow mode. $100k treasury seed. premium 0 → 5 bps.
2026 q2
public lp onboarding
premium 5 → 15 bps. tvl cap $5m.
2026 q2
tge — fair launch
44m lode seeded into lode/eth + lode/usdc pools. no airdrop, no claim. premium 15 → 25 bps. tvl cap $10m.
post-tge
month 1 → 12 preview
  • permissionless mode
  • builder pool expansion
  • flagship-scale tvl tranches
questions

frequently asked

isn't this just cowswap mev capture, rebadged?
no. cowswap and mev-share rebate at the user level. lode rebates the pool. the lp captures it, not the swapper, which is the side that actually bleeds from lvr.
what stops searchers from refusing to bid?
competition. if any searcher won't bid the real value of top-of-block flow, another will undercut them. the auction is sealed-bid, second-price, and runs every block; collusion is fragile because the prize is paid in eth, immediately.
does this widen spreads or hurt the user trying to swap?
no. user swaps execute against the same curve as a vanilla v4 pool. the only thing that changes is who captures the value of the first trade: currently a searcher, under lode, the lp.
where does the buyback go?
a 15% slice of every winning bid funds a market buy of lode via a twap. the bought tokens are routed back into the lp rebate vault, not burned, distributed.
how is this different from running a private order flow agreement?
it's permissionless. anyone can become a searcher, anyone can lp, and the splitter parameters are visible on-chain. no off-chain agreements, no exclusive routing, no privileged builders.