builders
pool parameters
every pool is parameterized by four values. the factory enforces hard ranges; within those, builders pick the values that match their pair's volatility profile.
| parameter | range | default | meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
premiumBps | 0 – 30 (tier ceiling) | 30 | bps charged on the first swap of each block, against swap input notional. |
builderFeeBps | 0 – 3000 | 2000 | your share of the captured premium, denominated in the same currency as the swap input. |
minAuctionInputSize | > 0 | 0.01 eth equiv | minimum swap size that consumes the per-block slot. dust-disarm defense (c2-01). |
beneficiary | any address | lp distributor | recipient of the lp share. usually the canonical lp-rewards distributor for the pool. |
choosing premiumBps
premium revenue is approximately linear up to ~30 bps, then collapses as arbitrageurs decline to execute. unless you have specific evidence about your pair, leave at 30.
choosing builderFeeBps
higher builder fee reduces lp share. for a pool you operate where you are also the lp, set this near 30%. for a pool where you intend to attract third-party lps, set it lower (e.g. 1000–2000) to advertise a competitive lp boost.
choosing minAuctionInputSize
set this to the smallest swap size where the captured premium ($) exceeds the swap-execution gas cost ($) by at least 5×. for eth/usdc on mainnet at 20 gwei, that's approximately 0.01 eth.
setting it too low exposes the pool to dust-disarm attacks. setting it too high skips legitimate small arbitrage swaps.
choosing beneficiary
this is the highest-value parameter. it should be:
- a battle-tested lp-rewards distributor (e.g. the canonical merkle distributor address)
- a contract whose source is verified and whose ownership is timelocked or burned
- not an eoa under your control unless your stake credibly disclaims that incentive
configuring a self-controlled eoa as beneficiary in a pool advertised as having "lp rewards" is a slashable offense (condition #2).