builders

builders · overview

lode adapts hyperliquid's hip-3 pattern to the amm-hook context. stake 100,000 lode, deploy a pool, and earn up to 30% of every premium captured on it for the entire life of that pool. this is the closest thing in defi to an equity slice in a real, fee-generating venue — and the only barrier to entry is conviction in the token you're already long.

who is this for

builders are typically:

• professional market-making firms with a thesis on a particular asset pair.
• protocol teams launching a token who want to capture lvr on their own pair.
• defi-native funds running concentrated-liquidity strategies that want to align with the lode token.

economics — why builders win twice

at $1 lode, the 100k stake represents $100k of capital locked. on a $50m flagship-tier pool capturing the modeled ~5% of tvl/yr in premium ($2.5m/yr gross), a 30% builder share is $750k/yr — a 750% gross return on the locked stake, before any lode price appreciation. on a more modest $5m long-tail pool, the same math returns ~$75k/yr, or 75% gross. these are real, on-chain, recurring cashflows, not roadmap promises.

and that's just the first leg. the second leg is the position itself: every builder is structurally long lode (their stake is denominated in it), and every dollar their pool generates contributes to the buyback that compresses lode supply. builders are paid in cashflow on the way up and paid in token appreciation on top. it is the most asymmetric setup we know how to design.

the economics ruthlessly favor builders who can attract real arbitrage volume. speculative pools that capture little premium will not recoup the stake's opportunity cost — and that's the point. the slot is reserved for operators who can actually deliver tvl and flow.

slashing conditions

governance can slash a builder's stake under any of the following conditions, codified in the staking contract as slash(poolId, beneficiary, amount):

1. the builder operates a pool with parameters violating the factory's constraints.
2. the pool's beneficiary is configured to siphon lp rewards rather than distribute them.
3. the pool is used to bypass other protocol safety properties.

slashed stake is transferred to a beneficiary address (typically the protocol treasury). a full slash deletes the stake entry entirely, allowing the pool's poolId to be redeployed by a different builder.

next steps